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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to determine some of the 
possible differences in three different types of motivation-
al orientations and two diff erent environmental conditions 
in behavior i n a barga ining game . Sixty undergraduates en-
rolled in General Psychol ogy at Fort Hays Kansas Sta te 
College were used. The three different motivational ori-
entations were: 1) cooperative, 2) competitive, and 3) in-
dividualistic; and the t wo different environmental conditions 
were: 1) face-to-face, and 2) behind-the-screen. The sub-
ject's task was to make one of two choices which could be 
e i ther a cooperative or a competitive choice. 
Significant differences were ob tained in comparing 
responses given in the three different motivational ori-
enta tions, but s i gnificant diffe rences were not obtained 
between responses i n the two different environmental con-
ditions. A cooperat ive ori entation led to more cooperative 
behavior than the individualistically or competitively ori-
ented groups and the competitively or iented was least 
cooperative of all. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The concern of the populace for bargaining is slowly 
being rewarded by the encouragement it has given scientists 
to make some empirical studies. Ther e are a host of con-
ditions in a game situation that are associated with bar-
gaining. The purpose of this study was to summarize what 
conditions have thus far been found to effect cooper a tion 
and to experiment with several entirely new conditions to 
reveal their importance in the bargaining situation. Be-
fore proceeding, however, a definition of game theory, 
barga ining, and conflict is necessary. 
Definition 
Conflict is the resul tant state when there is an op-
position between impulses. Ba r ga ining shall refer to tha t 
means by which one comes to terms. Game theory, although 
not really a written theory, conveys the combined connota-
tion of these two definitions. In essence, it refers to 
the barga ining that takes place in an a ttemp t to r e solve 
a conflict. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
All individuals at sometime or other in their lives 
are confronted with conflicts, usually many thousands of 
them throughout a lifetime. The conflicts, which are op-
positions between impulses, are generally resolved in a 
process of finding a solution by coming to agreeable terms 
between these opposing impulses, or, in other words, making 
a b argain, whether tha t bargain be within one's self, or 
between two individuals, or among groups of individuals. 
These conflicts, especi Rl ly the p ersonal ones, or the ones 
within the individual, if not solved may become more severe 
and in their extreme turmoil cause a neurosis. However, 
most individuals learn to make an intr pective agreement 
and resolve these conflicts, reduce their threat, and con-
sequently are able to live with them . For i l lustrative 
purposes visualize a hungry man confronted with food which 
he strongly suspects to be poisoned. He has two oppos ing 
impulses, one to eat and another to reject the food for 
fe a r of immediate death, thus composing a conflict. In 
order to resolve this conflict he must attempt to satisfy 
both drives which, intelligen tly, would be to look els e-
where for food. If he does this he has made a b ar gain 
(as defined in this paper), he has r eached agreeable terms 
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and resolved the prevalent conflict. It should be ev ident 
then that making a bargain is a strong motivating force. 
The motivation is energized by the misery and discomfort 
tha t a conflict may arouse. 
Game theory is a "youngster" as a theoretical concept, 
i nnovated appr oxima tely t wo decades ago. Since it s begin-
ning there have been only a modest number of experi mental 
studies published. However, a s few as there may be, they 
have unearthed exceedingly interesting results and, consequent-
ly, l a id the ground work for further experimentat ion. Stated 
a s generally as possible, game t heory's pr i me objective is 
to observe behavior i n a bar gaining situa tion. Of course, 
in observing behavior it is hoped to determine what con-
dition s are conducive to bar gaining and conversely, what 
conditions tend to hamper the reaching of agreement in a 
barga ining situation. 
The research and experimenta tion reported in this paper 
applies mainly to conflicts which are aroused by externa l 
conditions rather than internal needs. Resul ts from these 
studies may be generalized to most facets of life, since 
most phases of being inv·o1ve conflict. With respect to the 
value and practicality of game theory a s ynopsis of the 
relevant experimentation thus far accomplished follows. 
The most widely used experimental variable has been to 
study the effects of motivationa l orientation in a ba rga in-
ing situation. Deutsch (1960) used three groups of subjects 
I I 
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and by means of verbal instruction induced each group with 
a different orientation. The three groups were labeled: 
cooperative, individualistic, or competitive. The cooper-
ative group, before playing the game, wa s instructed that 
they were to be interes ted in winning a s much as they could 
for themselves, but at the same time they were to be in-
terested in help ing t heir partner to win as much as pos s ible. 
Under t he individualistic condition the group was told to 
attempt to win a s much as they could for themselves and not 
to worry about their partners because they felt exactly the 
same way. The competitive group wa s also encouraged to 
win as much a s possible for themselves and al so to try to 
beat or win more than the person p laying with them. The 
experiment resulted with the competitively oriented group 
being least cooper a tive in game beh vior, the cooperatively 
oriented group played the game mo s t cooperatively, and the 
individualistica lly oriented group fell midway between these 
t wo extremes. Deutsch concluded that a cooperative orien-
tation re sults in mutual trust and, cons equently, trust-
worthy or cooperative behavior, whereas a competitive orien-
t a tion results in suspicion and, consequently, untrust-
worthy or non-cooperative behavior. 
Willis and Joseph (1959) ran essentially the same type 
of experiment but also added another variable, money versus 
points, and found the same hierarchy of cooperativeness 
among the three , groups but also found that the added in-
centive of money as opposed to mere points made no dif-
fer ence in behavior under any of these three conditions. 
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In an additional experiment, this one to discern whether 
the va lues a s sociated with the game's payoff matrix could 
be causitive factors for directing behavi0r, Minas, Scodel, 
Marlowe, and Raws on , (1960) found that individuals per-
sisted t o play the game the s ame regardless of the dif-
fering payoff matrices. This wa s interpreted as indica-
ting that people vi ew a b ar gaining situation a s a situation 
whe r e one must compete. 
Scodel (1962) was a lso interested in the effects of 
motiva tional orientation or what he called "induced collab-
oration". In a pilot study he found tha t players pl a yed 
more cooperatively if they played a stooge with a prede-
termined stra tegy than if they were left to their own cap-
abilities to reach an agreement. He then a t temp ted to de-
termine whether different levels of collabora tion could be 
induced by varying the stra tegy of the stooge. In one 
condition the stooge's stra t egy wa s to make the coop er a tive 
choice on each trial r ega r dless of the subject's choice. 
I n the other condition the stooge ma de the competitive 
choice on the firs t ten trials and thereafter cho s e coopera-
tively without deviation. He conf irmed his hypothesis. 
Players who met with a competitive strategy followed by a 
6 
cooperative strategy were more cooperative than players 
who were met with a strategy which employed collaboration 
from the start. 
Under the assumption that the game may better be per-
ceived or understood by the players after some actual 
practice with it, Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, and Lipetz (1959) 
set out to determine whether subjects would tend to become 
more cooperative as the game lengthened. They constructed 
the game to run for fifty trials and they compared the num-
ber of coopera tive choices made in t he first twenty-five 
trials with those made in the last twenty-five trials. 
Their assumption was incorrect however, for the last twenty-
five trials had significantly fewer cooperative choices in 
it than the first twenty-five choices. This would indica te 
that as a game wears on its player s become more competitive. 
It is sometimes the case in bargaining situa tions such 
as union-management negotiations that a third party is called 
in to settle a dispute. Being curious about the effective-
ness of this notion Deutsch (1958) created a game situation 
to explore this phenomenon. In his game situation he had 
two people playing a bargaining game and also a third per-
son whose function was to predict the outcome of each trial 
in the game. The two players were motivated to accumulate 
as many points for themselves as possible and the third per-
son, if he predicted correctly the outcome of the trial, would 
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receive the difference between the two player's score, which 
would be nothing if both players made the cooperative choice 
since they would both receive the same amount. Before play-
ing the game the two players and the third party (who was 
an accomplice to the experimenter) took an intell i gence 
test together. The third party acted in a con spicuously 
obnoxious manner throughout the test in order to establish 
dislike for the third person. The results i l luminated the 
fact that the players became much more cooperative under 
these conditions than comparable groups playing the same 
game with the omission of the disliked third party. The 
explanation offered for these results wa s that when there 
is mutual suspicion between t wo people for another party 
the mutual susp icion instiga tes mutual trust between these 
two peopl e which results in trus i ng or cooperative behavior. 
On numerous occasions individuals are encouraged to 
come to agreement in the face of a threat. The threat is 
ordinarily used as a tool to enhance the threatener's position. 
Searching for scientific knowledge about the effectiveness 
of this condltion upon inducing collaboration Deutsch and 
Krauss (1962) devised an experiment whereby they coul d deter-
mine whether cooperation was the outcome of no threat, 
unilateral threat, or bilateral threat. The results clearly 
indicate that bargaining will most likely occur when no 
threat is present, is a little le s s likely to occur in the 
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unilateral threat condition, and is least likely to occur in 
the bilateral threat condition. Therefore, it would appear 
that in most conflict situations agreement will be more 
likely to occur if neither of the two parties tries to 
threaten the other. 
While most of these bargaining games were run under 
condttions of no communica tion it seemed plausible that being 
able to communicate in any way might induce collaboration. 
Working toward an answer to this possibility Morton Deutsch 
(1958) constructed an experimental procedure whereby the 
players were allowed to pass notes between themselves. Under 
this condition his players became more trusting and played 
the game more cooperatively than players who were not allowed 
to send notes. Then, two years later (1960), he used this 
same means of communica tion in an ex eriment employing three 
different motivational orientations, those being: cooperative, 
individualistic, and competitive. Under these three different 
motivational orienta tions he compared the results of. the 
communicative group with that of a non-communicative group. 
He found that communication had no effect upon the coopera-
tively oriented group, but this was simply because this 
group played cooperatively regardless of their chance to 
communicate. However, the biggest change in behavior that 
communication brought about was in the individualistically 
oriented group. This group became just about as cooperative 
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when able to communicate as the cooperatively oriented group. 
The competitively oriented group became a little more coop-
erative when allowed to send notes but not significantly so. 
Then after a lapse of another two years Deutsch and Krauss 
(1962) again studied the effects of communication, but this 
time communication was in the oral form and allowed during 
each response period. This game set-up resulted in the play-
ers not using the communication period for talking about 
the game ,and, consequently, it did not induce collaboration. 
They then entered the condition of compulsory communication 
and the verbalization during each communication per iod had 
to be in some way rela ted to t he immediate game . Under these 
restrictions the player s tended to use their opportunity to 
communica te as a means of deciphering their opponent's strategy 
and this led to competit i ve behavior. They summarized these 
results as opposed to the results of Morton Deutsch's two 
previous studies by saying that when communication was in 
the form of notes the players were committed to behave as 
their notes had suggested, in order to save face, since they 
had committed themselves on paper, wherea s oral communication 
was generally ambiguous and non-committing. 
In summary, a c ooperative orientation, a disliked third 
person, a method of communica ting by sending notes, and an 
opponent who is a stooge with a preconceived strategy may 
induce collaboration. Whereas, a chance to verbal l y com-
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municate, a game that is lengthened, or the ability to threat-
en may cause individuals to play competitively in a game 
where cooperation is the most beneficial alternative. 
Several factors appear to make little if any difference in 
instigating any particular mode of behavior. One being the 
manipulation of the matrix values and the other being the 
added incentive of using real money in the game payoff as 
opposed to simply giving the subjects points which carry no 
va lue outside the game situation. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study was to investigate several 
sets of conditions which the writer felt might have signif-
icant effects upon a player~s behavior in a ba rgaining sit-
uation. Evidence has been presented that motivational 
orientation has a strong influence upon an individual's bar-
gaining behavior (Deutsch, 1960; Willis & Joseph, 1959; 
and Scodel, 1962). However, these result s were gained under 
experimental conditions which concealed the identity of each 
person in the bargaining situation. Thi s being the case 
it would appear only reasonable that before the r esul ts 
stemming from these previous studies can be taken at face 
value and generalized to other bargain· ng situations, the 
effect of revealing the participant's identity should be 
investigated. Since a l a rge number of bar gaining situations 
occur under condit ions of full awareness of one another's 
presence the effects of this awa renes s should be stud ied. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine 
the effect of either seeing one's partner or not seeing 
one's partner in a barga ining situation while playing the 
game under three different motivational orientations. Under 
these conditions it was hypothesized that the subjects play i ng 
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this bargaining game while facing the other player would 
play more cooperatively than subj ects playing the game 
while unaware of the other player's identity. It was also 
hypothesized tha t the subjects motivated to coopera te would 
cooperate more than subjects motivated to compete, and tha t 
subjects motivated 0nly to try to achieve a s much a s pos s ible 
for themselves without reference to competing or cooperating 
would bargain in a manner tha t would be in between the two 
extremes of behavior elicited by the competitively oriented 




The subjects for this study were drawn from several 
sections of the General Psychology classes at Fort Hays 
Kansas State College. Sixty subjects were used and these 
subjects participated in this experiment only under their 
expressed wish to volunteer. The sex and/or age of the 
subjects was not controlled, but it was assumed that there 
would be an approximately equal number of male and female 
subjects and that their ages would range, for the most 
part, from eighteen to twenty years of age. This assumption 
was made since General Psychology is a required course and 
is usually taken within the first two years of college 
training. 
Method 
A non-zero-sum game was used in this experiment. A 
non-zero-sum game is a game in which both players may gai n, 
both may lose, or one may gain and the other lose on a trial. 
The game started with the subjects looking at a diagram of 
the game's matrix which is diagramed in Figure I, Appendix A. 
While looking at the diagram the subjects listened to tape-re-
corded instructions which were given to the subjects so that 
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they would know exactly what the situation was and under-
stand the implica tions of any combination of choices that 
they and the other person might make. The instructions 
were read as follows: 
There are two of you who are going to play 
a game in which you can either win money 
or lose money. The money is going to be 
i maginary money; but I want you to make 
believe that it is real money. In other 
words, I want you t o feel that it is i m-
portant to you to win as much a s you can 
in this game tha t you are going to play. 
Try to feel tha t it r eally makes a differ-
ence to you whether you win a lot or a 
little. 
Here is how the game is pl ayed. There 
are two of you, and how much you win or 
lose is determined not only by what you 
yourself do but also by wha t t he other 
person does. On the paper which is in 
front of you there ls a di agram which 
shows how the game is played. One of you 
is Person I (the experimenter designates 
who Person I is); the o er is Person II 
(the experimenter designates who Person 
II is). Person I ha s t o choose between 
Row X and Row Y, while Person II has to 
choose between Column A and Column B. 
The amount of money tha t Person I can 
win or lose is ind icated by the first 
number in each parenthesis, the amount 
of money that Person II can win or lose 
is indicated by the second number. 
How much money either of you wins or 
loses is de termined by the choices which 
you each make. Let me i l lustra te by 
considering Person I. Suppose he chooses 
Row X; whether he wins $3, or $0 will be 
determined by wha t Person II does. If 
Person I choose s Row X and Person II 
chooses Column A, Person I will win $3. 
However, if Person I chooses Row X and Person 
II chooses Column B, Person I will win $0. 
Suppose Person I chooses Row Y; he will 
win either $5 or $1, depending upon whether 
Person II ehooses Column A or Column B. 
If you compare the choice between Rows X and 
Y for Person I, you'll notice that, if he 
chooses Y and Person II chooses Column A, 
Person I will win $5 rather than $J. If 
Person I chooses Y and Person II chooses 
B, he will win $1 rather than $0. 
Now let us consider Person II; wha t he can 
win or lose is indica ted by the second 
numbers in the parentheses. He has to 
choose between Columns A and B; how much 
he wins or loses is determined not only 
by his own choice but also by how Person 
I chooses. Thus, if Person II chooses 
Column A and Per son I chooses Row X, 
Person II will win $3. On t he ot her hand, 
if Person I chooses Y when Person II chooses 
A, Person II win win $0. If Person II 
chooses B he can win either $5 or $1, de-
pending upon wha t Person I do es. If Per-
s on I chooses X, Person II, by choosing 
B, will win $5 rather than $3. If Person 
I chooses Y, Person II, by choosing B, 
will win $1 r a ther than ~~ o. 
Let me point out an i nteresting thing : 
If Per son I choo ses Y and if Person II 
chooses B, t hen both Person I and Person 
II will win $1. On the ot her hand, i f 
Person I chooses X and Person II choose s 
A, then both Person I and II will win 
$3. However, if Pe r son I knows or can 
be as sured tha t Per son II is going to 
choose A, Person I can win more by 
choosing Y. Similarly, if Person II 
knows or can be a ssured tha t Per son I 
is going to choose X, Person II can win 
more by choosing B. If Person I chooses 
Y when II chooses A, I will wi n $6 and 
II will win $0. If Person II chooses B 
when I chooses X, II will win $5 and I 
will wi n $0. 
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Are there any questions about what happens 
when Person I chooses between Rows X and 
Y and Person II chooses between Columns 
A and B? (At this point they were asked 
some questions to ensure that there was 
complete understanding.) 
Okay, here's how you play the game. When 
I tell you to make your choice you will 
make your choice in secret, not telling 
the other person your choice. You will 
write your choice down on the sheet of 
paper I am now going to hand out. After 
you have made your choice raise your 
hand. When both Person I and Person II 
have rai sed their hands, I will look at 
each of your cho ices and pay you an appro-
priate number of poker chips. You will 
then be able to determine what choice the 
other player made by comparing the number 
of poker chips with the amounts in the 
game diagram. Are there any questions 
before we start playing the game? Please 
write your name, clas s ification, age, and 
sex on the sheet I have g iven you. 
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The different motivational orientations were created 
by inserting different paragraphs at the end of the instructions 
explaining the mechanics of the game. The instructions for 
the cooperative motivational orienta tion were: 
Before you start playing the game, let me 
emphasize that in playing the game you 
should consider yourselves to be partners. 
You're interested in your partner's wel-
fare as well as in your own. You do care 
how he does and he does care how you do. 
His feelings make a difference to you and 
your feelings make a differ ence to him. 
You want to win as much money a s you can 
for yourself and you wan t him to win. 
He feels exactly the same way, he wants 
you to win too. In other words, you each 
want to win money and you also want your 
partner to win too. 
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The individualistic motivational orientation was 
crea ted by using the following instructions: 
Before you start playing the game, let me 
emphasize that in pl aying the game your 
only motiva tion should be to win as much 
money as you can for yourself. You are 
to have no interest wha t soever in how much 
the othe r person wins. You don't care how 
he does and he doesn't ca re how you do . 
Assume tha t you don't know each other and 
tha t you'll never see each other again . 
Hi s feelings don't make any difference to 
you and your feelings don't make any differ-
ence to him. You 're not out to help him 
and you're not out to beat him. You simply 
want to win as much money as you can for 
yourself and you don't care what happens 
to him. He feels exactly t he same way . 
The instructions for t he competitive motivational 
orientation were : 
Before you start playing the game, let me 
emphasize tha t in playing the game your 
motivation should be to win as much money 
as you can for yourself nd also to do 
better than the other pe r son . You want 
to make rather than lose money but you 
also want to come out ahead of t he other 
person. Assume tha t you don't know each 
other and tha t you'll never see each 
other again. His feelings don't make 
any difference to you and your feelings 
don't make any difference to him. Accept 
the fact that you're out to beat him and 
he's out to bea t you. 
The subjects did not know how many trials they would 
be playing which , thusly, kept them from contaminating 
their last response. Their partner wa s always a stooge 
although they were not aware of this fact. By 
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using a stooge it was hoped that the facial expressions that 
would be 0bservable in the face-to-face condition would be 
controlled. The stooge only faked playing the game and 
the game was structured thusly: Each time the experi-
mental subject made the collaborative choice (X or A), he 
was paid as though his partner also made the collabo-
rative choice. The first time the subject made a compet-
itive choice (Y or B) he was paid the maximum for that 
choice ($5) just as though his partner had made the collabo-
rative choice. However, thereafter his competitive choice 
brought him the minimum payoff for that choice, ($1), 
which would indicate that his partner had also chosen com-
petitively. 
The sixty subjects were divided evenly i n to six 
groups, ten in each. Three oft e six groups played 
this game from behind a screen while the other three groups 
played it in a face-to-face position. Then, each one 
of these three groups in either the f ace-to-face or behind-
the-screen condition received a different motivational 
orientation. Consequently, there was a group of ten 
subjects in the face-to-face condition who received the 
cooperative orientation, ten other subjects in the f ace-to-
face condition who received the competitive orientation, 
and ten other subjects in the f~ce-to-face condition who 
received the individualistic orientation. The same was 
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true for the behind-tbe-screen condition; there was a 
competitive, cooperative, and individualistic group 
in it. 
This resulted in having the f0llowing six groups: 
1) a behind-the-screen environmental condition with a coop-
erative orienta tion, 2) a behind-the-screen environmental 
condition with an individualistic orienta tion, 3) a behind-
the-screen environmenta l condition with a cooperative orien-
tation, 4) a face-to-face environmental condition with a 
competitive orientation, 5) a face-to-face environmental 
condition with an individualistic orientation, and 6) a 
face-to-f ace environmental condition with a cooperative 
orienta tion. 
Apparatus 
The two environmental condi t ons were atta ined by 
using two tables, one on both sides of a movable partition 
which completely hid the view of the two players from 
one another. In the f ace-to-face condition the partition 
was removed to reveal the identity of the two players. 
A small rack with the game diagram on it was slanted 
upward so as to hide t he player 's response sheet which 
made it impossible for either subject to see the other 
subject's responses. 
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The three motivational orienta tions were attained 
by p l aying the t ape recorded instructions with the different 
motiva tional orientations included. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The data were reported in terms of frequency of oc-
curence of cooperative responses. The criterion for a 
cooperative choice in this game was for the experimental 
subject, who was always Person I, to make the "X" response. 
In analyzing the data, an analysis of variance and t tests 
were used where appropri ate. 
The analysis of the data showed tha t there was a sig-
nificant difference in the amount of cooperative choices 
among the three different motivational orientation groups 
but no difference in cooperative choices between the face-
to-face and the behind-the-screen groups. Also, there was 
not a significant difference between subject' s behavior 
while playing the game with he cooperative orien t at ion 
when seated face-to-face or behind-the-screen; or with the 
individualistic orientation when seated face-to-face or 
behind-the-screen; or with the competitive orientation when 
seated face-to-face or behind-the-screen. Thusly, the 
first hypothesis (that motivational orientation woul d have 
differing effects upon bargaining behavior) was supported, 
but the second one (that the environmental conditions would 
have differing effects upon bargaining behavior) was not. 
As may be seen in Table I, page 22, the expected hier-
archy in amount of cooperative behavior was found in the 
TABLE I 
TABLE OF MEANS, AND LIST OF t VALUES FOR 
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TABLE II 23 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Source df M S F 
Environmental Conditions 1 o.41 
Motivational Orientations 2 14.47 9 .11 ** 
Interaction 2 2.47 
Treatmen t 5 6.86 4. 31 ** 
Error 54 1.59 
** Significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. 
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three different motivational orientations. The tA,B (coop-
erative vs. individualistic) and the tA,c(cooperative vs. 
competitive) were both significant at the 0.01 level of 
confidence, whereas the tB,C (individualistic vs. competitive) 
wa s not significant. 
As may be seen in Table II, page 23, the face-to-face 
and behind-the-screen conditions, and the interaction be-
tween the environmental conditions and motivational orien-
tations was not significant. 
The data indicate that a cooperative orientation will 
induce cooperation significantly more than either a com-
pet itive or individualistic orientation. Al so, the indi-
vidualistic orientation will not induce cooperation sig-
nificantly more than a competitive orientation. 
The data also indicate tha t playing a bargaining game 
face-to-face will not induce cooperation significantly more 
than playing the game behind-the-screen. The diff e rence 
between the environmental conditions and the motivational 
orientation conditions not being significant suggest t hat 
the s e conditions operate independently of one another. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the da ta revealed that subjects' be-
havior in a game may be swayed by the suggestion of wha t 
their motives in the game should be. Of the three com-
parisons made among the motiva tional orientation groups, 
the amount of collaboration was highest i n the cooperative 
group , lowest in the competitive group, and in between in 
the individualistic group. 
The data did not bear out a di f ference between sub-
jects' behavior in the face-to-face and behind-the-screen 
conditions. The diffe r ence in behavior between these two 
groups was so small that it was concluded that facing one's 
partner in a game, or being unaw re of one's partner by 
concealing him behind a screen, made no difference in how 
cooperatively the game was played. 
It would appear that individuals are generally compet-
itively oriented when faced with a b arga ining situa tion as 
was borner. out by Willis and Joseph (1959), who found that 
people generally approach a game or barga ining situation in 
a competitive, individualistic, self-interest kind of way 
even when the most appropriate behavior would be cooperative. 
Consequently, to instill a c ooperative orientation, the in-
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dividuals' motives toward bargain ing must be manipulated. 
The way these motives may be manipulated is by suggestion. 
Th i s is exactly what the present experiment demons trated. 
When the subjects were individualistically oriented their 
game s trategy was no t suggested. It would follow then that 
whatev er stra tegy they chose would apparently be indicative 
of their t yp ical motivat i on in a bargaining situa tion. The 
behavior they exhibited in this condition was not significant-
ly different from the behavior displayed by the competitively 
oriented subj ect s . Therefore, peopl e to whom competitive 
sugge s tions are g iven closely resemble people who are not 
told to compete or to cooperate. 
Since the general nature of the subject's behavior in 
the competitive and individuali st ic orientations was com-
petitive, and quite different fro m that behavior of the 
cooperatively oriented group 's behavior; we ma y conclude 
tha t the differ ence resulted from the suggestion of coop-
erativeness. 
An interpretation as to how the suggestion of a par-
ticular game s trategy works in swaying one' s behavior would 
appear to be in direct rela tion with one's own perceived in-
tention s in a b arga ining situation. When one is told to try 
to beat his opponent and that his opponent is going to do 
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the same, he suspects that his opponent will not make the 
rational choice that would be beneficial to both since it 
would not enable him to beat the other player. It is not 
surprising that individuals compete when it is suggested 
tha t they compete, but it is paradoxical that they should 
do so at the los s of prospering for themselves when self-
gain ls also part of the motivation. What seems t o happen 
is that when one enters a game or bargaining situation with 
a competitive intention he perceives his partner as having 
the same intention. This makes him suspicious of making 
a cooperative choice with any consistency at all since, 
even though its reward value is higher than the reward value 
of the competitive choice, he can not trust his partner to 
make the cooperative choice. 
Similarly, the cooperative behavior which results from 
a cooperative orientation is a result of the subject's per-
ceived intention of his opponent's intention. He feels 
that his intention is also that of the other per son's. 
This tends to form a mutual trust which, if reinforced 
after the first trial, will continue to exhibit itself 
throughout the game. This is precisely what happened in 
this experiment. The player's intention which was per-
ceived as al so being the other player's intention, formed 
a mutual trust and their assumption was reinforced by the 
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experimenter always reinforcing the cooperative choice. 
This hypothetical condition of mutual trust led these 
subjects to bargaining behavior tha t was more benef i cial 
and appropria te than any of the behavior exhib ited by any 
of the other subject s . Consequently, one's bargaining be-
havior can be molded according to the mood s e t by the bar-
gaining situa tion. 
The importance of this is tha t if cooperation is the 
desired behavior in a ba rgaining situation the strategy 
must be made explicit and the behavior must be reinforced 
if it is to continue. Conversely, if competitive behavior 
is the mo st appropriate behavior in the situation it will 
emerge as a function of one's wish for self-gain by simply 
entering the bargaining situation. However, to i n tensify 
this competitive behavior its ould a l so be made explicit 
tha t the individuals motive s are to be to outdo, bea t, or 
win in the situa tion. 
The reason significant results were not found between 
the two environmental conditions of face-to-face and behind-
the-screen wa s felt to be a function of the strength and 
influence that perceived i n tentions seem to have upon bar-
gaining behavior. As stated above, i ndividuals appear to 
assume tha t their intention will be the same as their 
opponent's intention. They therefore either trust that 
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c ooper a tion will result if their i n tention is to cooperate, 
or they as sume tha t competition will result if their own 
i n t ention is to compete even when cooperation is more 
sat isfying to t he self-gain motive which they a l s o were 
instruc t ed to have . As it was, facing a per son or not 
apparently had no effect upon their perceived i n tent i on s 
and consequ ently did not effect the behavior of the subjects. 
In the t h ird chapt e r it wa s suggested that t he previous 
studies utilizing thi s b a r gain i ng game to study bar gaining 
behavior shoul d be viewed skeptica lly. The basis for this 
skepticism wa s t ha t all the studies thus far had studied 
b a r gaining behavior in t he behind-the-screen condition and 
most bargai n ing s ituations seemed to be more close l y related 
to f ace-to-face ba r gaining. But, since the environmental 
conditions did not have the predicted effect, it woul d appea r 
tha t these other experiments can be taken at f a c e va lue. 
Though it was beyond the scope of th i s research it 
would be inter esting to determine the effect of i n telligence 
upon bargaining behavior. It may be tha t, on the a verage, 
smarter individuals woul d be less persuaded by the mere 
suggestion of a motive than the less intelligent individuals. 
Another possibility for a follow-up study woul d be an 
a ttempt to determine wha t personality characteristics are 
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most conducive to c ooperation. One such study could be to 
screen subjects for those who are high in aggressive and 
ho s tile char acteristics and t hose who a re low in these char-
acteristics to see whether these personal ity characteristics 
caus e significantly different game s tra tegies in and of them-
selves. Related to this would be an attempt to see whether 
a person who i s narcissistic bargains differently from an 
individual who has a poor self-image. 
Pending further investigation it may be that this game 
situa tion may not only tell us some thing about the variables 
which effect b argaining behavior, but also it could con-
ceiveably be come a useful diagnostic tool. If further re-
search bears out conclusive evidence that certain personality 
charac t eristics are r e lated to specific ways in which a game 
such as t h is one i s perceived and played, then it could be-
come a useful tool for the clinician in helping him form his 
hypotheses about hi s pa tients. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study was designed to deter mine some of t he possi-
b le diffe rences in three different type s of motiva tional ori-
entations and t wo diff erent environmen t a l conditions i n be-
h avior in a ba r gaining game. The subjects were sixty under-
gr adua te studen t s enrolled in General Psychology at For t 
Hays Kan s a s State Col l ege , Hays, Kansas. The subject s were 
r andomly as s i gned to one of six gr oups, each group cons i s t-
ing of ten subj ects. Ea.ch group had one of three pos s ible 
motivational orientations and one of t wo pos s ible environ-
men tal cond itions. The three motiva t i onal orien t a tions were: 
1) coopera tive, 2 ) competitive, and 3) ind ividualist ic; 
and the t wo environmental condi tions were: 1) f ace-to-
face, and 2) beh ind-the-screen. The subj ect' s t ask wa s to 
make one of t wo choice s in the game. One cho ice (X) wa s 
cons idered the cooperative choice becaus e it maximized t he 
ga in for both players. The other choice (Y) wa s considered 
the competitive choice s ince it maximized self-gain at the 
los s of the other player. The game l a sted for fiv e t r i als 
and the subject s got paid imaginary money in the form of 
poker chips after each trial. The subjects did not know tha t 
the fifth trial would be the last trial. Th is wa s done for 
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purposes of controlling for possible contamination of the 
l a st trial. 
In analyzing the data, an analysis of variance and t 
t est s were used where appropriate. Significant differences 
were obtained among the motivational oriented groups. 
The number of cooperative responses given by subjects who 
p l ayed the game in the ~ehind-the-screen condition were not 
significantly different from the number given by the subjeets 
who played the game in the face-to-face condition. 
The significant differ ence obtained indicated that there 
i s a difference in the behavior tha t will occur under different 
motiva tional orientations. The differ ence i ndica ted that a 
coopera tive orienta tion results in the most appropri ate be-
havior for this game, that being cooperative. The least 
appropri ate behavior for this gam was exhibited by the sub-
jects who received a competitive orienta tion which resulted 
in an abundance of competitive responses. The individual-
istical ly-oriented subjects' behavior resembled closely that 
of the competitively-oriented subjects', but with a lit t le 
more cooperation. These results were discussed in t erms of 
possible implications for other bargaining situations. Tha t 
is, a b a r gain ing situation must explicitly spell out the 
appropriate motives for it s participants. 
Several suggestions for further research were mentioned. 
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One such sugges tion was t o det er mi ne t he differen tial ef fect s 
of dif f erent motivational or i enta t i ons upon different l evels 
of int ell igence. Another resea rch top ic wh ich woul d be of 
importance would b e to de t er mine whether diffe r ent person-
al ity char acteristic s elicit diff er ent pa t terns of b ehavior 
in t h is b argaining situation. If it we r e de te r mined t hat 
d ifferen t per s onality types played differ ently i n this game, 
then th i s game mi ght be come a u s eful diagnostic tool f or the 
cl i n ician in a i d i ng him t o recogn ize d i f f eren t per s ona lity 
t y es . 
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APPENDIX A 




X (3, 3) 
Y (5, 0) 
B 
( O, 5) 
(1, 1) 
Person I chooses between rows X 
and Y, Person II between columns 
A and B. Person I's payoffs are 
the first numbers in the paren-
theses; Person II's are these-
cond numbers. 
